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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

CREDIT INDUSTRIAL LOAN PLAN,
a corporation,
Appellwnt,
Case No.

-vs.-

8162

PURL F. PETERSON and CARMA
. PETERSON,
Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

The above named appellant, plaintiff in the DiHtrif't
Court, appeals from the judgment entered in this eamw
by that court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed suit in the Third Judicial Dist rid
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah on a
promissory note and chattel mortgage eX<'<"utrd hy thr
1
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defendants and delivered to plaintiff evidencing a loan
of money by plaintiff to defendants. Copies of the note
and mortgage attached to plaintiff's complaint show that
said note was executed by the defendants on May 31,
1952 whereby they agreed to pay to the plaintiff the sum
of $1,376.88 in twenty-four consecutive monthly installments of $57.37 each, beginning July 12, 1952. The mortgage provided that the proceeds of any sale made pursuant either to the foreclosure of the mortgage or by
notice and sale according to law would be applied first
to the payment of charges and then to the payment of
the principal balance due on nwrtgagor's note in accordance with its terms, and that the mortgagor would be
liable for any deficiency. Said defendants were in default when the complaint was filed. Plaintiff is a duly
licensed and qualified Industrial Loan Corporation under
Title 7, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Defendants answered alleging that the interest
charged by plaintiff on said loan was in excess of that allowed by 15-1-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and that
therefore said note and mortgage were void for usury.
Defendants also counterclaimed for judgment against
plaintiff in the amount of t320.48, which amount defendants had paid to plaintiff on said loan.
The matter came on for pretrial hearing on December 30, 1953 before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, one of
the Judges of the Third District Court. At said hearing
the parties stipulated that the interest charged by the
plaintiff on said loan "\vas in excess of ten percent per

2
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anntun simple interest as allowed by 15-1-2, Utah Code
Annotated 1953. Defendants thereupon moved for a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and for summary judgment against plaintiff in accordance with defendants'
counterclaim on the ground that the loan in question could
not be made under the Industrial Loan Act (Title 7,
Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated 1953) because the final
payment on said loan as shown by the face of the note
was not due until June 12, 1954, a longer period of time
than two years from the date of making the loan, to-wit,
twelve days, and therefore offends against section 7-8-5
(1) of said Act. The trial court granted defendants' motions and entered judgment in the following terms on
F·ebruary 8, 1954:
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED as follows, to-wit:
1. The complaint of the plaintiff filed herein
is dismissed with prejudice on the grounds of
'no cause of action.'

2. Judgment be entered against the plaintiff
in favor of the defendants in the sum of Three
hundred twenty and 48/100 dollars.
3. The chattel mortgage given by defendants
in favor of plaintiff dated 31 ~fay 1952 is hereby
declared null and void and of no effect and any
lien or cloud upon the title to any and all of the
property described in said chattel mortgage resulting from said chattel mortgage is hereby removed."
Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal, together with
defendants' Waiver of Cost Bond, on March 6, 1954.

3
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The sole question sub1nitted by this appeal is one
of the interpretation of the Industrial Loan Act known
as Title 7, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated 1953 and may
be stated as follows : "Do the provisions of this Act prohibit a corporation duly licensed to do business under and
by virtue of said Act from making a loan of money for
a period longer than two years where such loan has been
made on personal security of the borrower, and in this
case a promissory note secured by a mortgage; said
mortgage providing for the usual procedure, namely, that
upon sale of the property recited in the mortgage that if
the proceeds are not sufficient to satisfy the unpaid balance of said note, then and in that event the n1ortgagor
shall he liruble for the deficiency." This plaintiff and
appellant contends that it has a right to make such a
loan under said Act in excess of two years where said
loan is evidenced by a promissory note secured by a
mortgage; further that the trial court erred in granting
defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment thereby in ·substance holding that under the provisions of said Act industrial loan corporations do not
have the power to make loans on personal security for
a period in excess of two years. (Agreed Statement of
Record on Appeal pursuant to Rule 75 (o), U.R.C.P.)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION
THAT THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL LOAN ACT PROHIBITS
THE MAKING OF LOANS SECURED BY CHATTEL MORTGAGES FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN TWO YEARS.

4
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION
THAT THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL LOAN ACT PROHIBITS
THE MAKING OF LOANS SECURED BY CHATTEL MORTGAGES FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN TWO YEARS.
1.
ACT.

PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL LOAN

The Utah Industrial Loan Act grants certain powers
to corporations who qualify and are licensed under that
Act. Particularly material to the issue presented by this
appeal are the following provisions (citations herein refer to Utah Code Annotated 1953 unless otherwise
stated) :
"7 -8-3. General Powers. - Every industrial
loan corporation shall have power:
(1) To loan money on the personal undertaking of the borrower and other persons, or on
personal security, or otherwise, and to deduct
interest thereon in advance at the rate of one
per cent or less of the face of such loan per month,
***
(2) To issue and sell certificates for the
payment of money at any time, either fixed or
uncertain, and to receive payments therefor in
installments or otherwise, with or without allowance of interest on such installments; provided,

5
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that nothing herein shall he construed to authorize such corporations to receive deposits or to create any liability due on de1nand. The certificates
issued by any such corporation shall he approved
as to form by the bank commissioner, and shall
bear upon the face of the instrument the words,
'This is not a certificate of deposit.'
7-8-5. Certain acts forbidden. corporation shall:

No such

(1) Make any loan on the security of makers,
co-m.akers, ilndorsers, sureties or guarantors for
a longer period than two years from the· date
thereof.

(2) Hold at any one time the obligation or
obligations of any one person aggregating more
than two per cent of the amount of its paid up
capital and surplus.
(3) Make any loan or discount on the security of its own capital stock, or be the purchaser
or holder of any such shares, unless the taking of
such security or such purchase shall be necessary
to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted
in good faith, or unless such purchase is made upon sale for delinquent assessments. Stock so purchased or acquired shall be sold within ninety
days from the time of its purchase or acquisition.
( 4) Make any loan or discount, directly or
indirectly, to any director, officer or employee
of such corporation.
( 5) Have outstanding at any time its certificates or other evidences of debt in an aggregate
sum in excess of five times the aggregate amount
of its paid up capital and surplus.
()
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( 6) Exact a surrender charge on certificates
issued by it.
7-8-6. Reserve required. -Every such corporation shall at all times maintain and have on
hand a reserve in an ainount equal to five per cent
of its liabilities on outstanding certificates.
7-8-7. Reports to bank commissioner. Every industrial loan corporation shall make to
and file with the bank commissioner on or before
the 31st day of J'anuary of each year, according
to forms prescribed by him, a report verified by
the president, manager or treasurer, and attested by at least two directors, showing the true
condition of the corporation as of the preceding
December 31, and shall make and file special reports when and as called for by the commissioner." (Emphasis added.)
It seems clear that the provisions of 7-8-3 (1) above
quoted authorize the making of three types of loans,
classified on the basis of the type of security involved:
( 1) the personal undertaking of the borrower and other
persons ; ( 2) or on personal security; ( 3) or otherwise.
The language and punctuation used make this conclusion
inescapable. It is the position of this appellant that the
two year time limitation imposed by 7-8-5 (1) as set forth
above applies only to the first type of loans, and not to
the other two.
A brief review of the history of the Utah Industrial
Loan Act strongly supports this posi tio·n. On March 12,
1925 the Legislature of the State of Utah passed an act
defining industrial loan companies and providing for
their incorporation (Laws of Utah 1925, Chapter 116).

7
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This act became effective 1\Iarch 21, 1925 and provided
in part as follows:
"Section 4. Powers - fees - approval of
bank commissioner. EYery corporation under the
provisions of this act shall have power :
(a) To loan money on the personal wndertakilng of the borrower and other persons, or on
personal security, or otherwise. * * *" (emphasis
added.)
As may be seen the wording of the present law in this
respect is identical with the wording of the original1925
Act.
The 1925 Act contained no limitations as to the
length of loans to be made under its provisions.
On March 10, 1927 the Legislature amended the
1925 Act and added new sections which imposed certain
limitations and restrictions on the operations of industrial loan companies (Laws of Utah 1927, Chapter 50).
This Act !became effective May 10, 1927 and provided
insofar as is material to the issues herein involved as follows:
"Sec. 4X. Restrictions. No corporation, under the prov:i:sions of this Act, shall :
(a) Make any loan on the security of makers, co-make:rs, endorsers, sureties or guarantors
for a longer period than one year from the date
thereof.
(b) Hold at any one time the primary obligation or obligations of any person, firm, or corporation for more than two per cent of the amount

8
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of the paid-up capital and surplus of such industrial loan company.
(c) Make any loan or discount on the security of its own capital stock, or be the purchaser
or holder of any such shares unless such security
or purchase shall be necessary to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in good faith.
Stock so purchased or acquired shall be sold or
otherwise disposed of within ninety days from the
time of its purchase or acquisition.
(d) 1fake any loan or discount, directly or
indirectly to any director, officer or employee of
such corporation.
(e) Have outstanding at any time its investment certificates or other evidence of debt, in an
aggregate sum in excess of five times the aggregate amount of its paid-up capital and surplus.
(f) Exact a surrender charge on investment
certificates issued by the corporation." (Emphasis
added.)
As can he seen the 1927 amendment added the restrictions, including a time limit on certain loans made
under the Industrial Loan Act, which are now in the
present act as 7-8-5, with the exception that the period
of limitation was only one year.
The 1933 code revision deleted certain preliminary
sections from the 1925 Act, none of which sections are
material to the issues herein involved.
On January 26, 1939 the Legislature amended the
time restriction enacted in 1927 as set forth above by extending the one year limitation to two years, changing
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that section to the way it reads today.
It is clear from a review of the history of this Act
and its amendments that the time limitation imposed by
the 1927 amendment applies not to all loans made by industrial loan corporations, but that said limitation applies only to loans made on the security of makers, comakers, endorsers, sureties or gttarantors. If it had been
the intent of the Legislature to apply the time limitation
to all loans it would be a very simple matter to so state.
If such had been the legislative intent obviously the restrictive amendment would have read: "No such corporation shall make any loan for a longer period than two
years from the date thereof."
It is an elementary principle of statutory construCtion that all words contained in a statute are· to be given
meaning. The construction as contended for by the respondents and adopted by the trial court would strip
the qualifying words of makers, comakers, endorsers,
sureties or guarantors of any meaning whatsoever. This
Court should be reluctant to construe the statute in question in a manner which would in effect delete these words
from the provision.
2.

THE PURPOSE OF THE TWO YEAR LIMITATION.

When the purpose of the two year limitation is examined into it becomes even more obvious that the limitation does not apply to loans like the one in the instant
case.
Under the Utah Industrial Loan Act an industrial

10
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loan company is in effect an industrial bank, substantially similar to industrial banks in many other states,
although in Utah such companies may not use the word
ba.nk in their nmnes (7-3-57), nor can their investment
certificates be referred to as deposits or savings accounts
7-8-3 (2) ). However, under the Utah Act all industrial
loan companies are entitled to issue and sell investment
certificates to the public and to pay interest thereon
just as any bank or trust company accepts savings deposits and pays a stipulated rate of interest thereon.
Thus an industrial loan company becomes a quasi-public
institution. On December 31, 1953 there were over 2.8
million dollars of such monies from the public invested
in various Utah industrial loan companies (Biennial Report of the Bank Commissioner June 30, 1954). These
savings are owned by thousands of individuals and for
their protection the Bank Commissioner, pursuant to
statute, (7-8-7) examines the companies involved with
the same care as he examines banks holding depositors'
monies.
It should be noted that the re,strictions on the operations of industrial loan companies set forth in section
7-8-5 were not contained in the original 1925 Act, but
were added later. A sirnple reading of those six restrictions will show that they are all obviously directed to the
protection and safe guarding of the funds of the holders
of investment certificates since they restrict the amount
that might be loaned to one person, prohibit loans on
the security of the company's own stock, etc. Sections
7-8-6 and 7-8-7 contain additional requirements for the
11
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further protection of the public investor.
With this purpo·se (to protect the funds invested
by the public) in mind, it then is very clear that the two
year limitation was intended to apply only to those loans
which had no security other than the signature of makers,
co-makers, indorsers, sureties or guarantors. Obviously
the Legrslature considered that such loans were too poor
a risk for a period longer than two years, but where
other security was obtained the risk was not as great,
and loans for a longer period might be justified.
Does the construction of the two year provision
adopted by the trial court harmonize with this obvious
intent and purpose of the Legislature 1 On the contrary,
it flies in the teeth of that expressed intent. The trial
court in effect says all industrial loans are subject to the
two year limit. If the Legislature had intended to so
restrict the making of all industrial loans it would have
said so. But instead, the Legislature only limited loans
made on signatures. The language used unquestionally
shows that the purpose was to protect the public investors by limiting the time period of signature or cosignor loans.
It rs elementary that effect must if possible he given
to every word of a statute and that the statute must be
read as a whole.
It cannot be questioned that by the original act these
companies were authorized to take interest in advance
on loans made either on "the personal undertaking of the

12
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borrower and other persons, or on personal security,
or otherwise ***." The original act allowed a deduction
of intere-st at the rate of 12% of the face of the loan.
By the 1927 amendment, this was changed so as to permit
the deduction of interest in advance at the rate of 1%
per month or less of the face of the loan and the, time
limitation was impos'ed with respect to loans on "the
security of makers, co-makers, endorsers, sureties or
guarantors" limiting such loans to one year from the
date thereof.
This limitation was made in an added section and
not by an amendment to the section which authorized
loaning money and did not include directly or by implication the words "or on personal se-curity, or otherwise."
The 1939 amendment extended this time limitation
with respect to loans on the security of the makers, etc.
to two years and again took no account of loans "on personal security, or otherwise."
As it stands therefore, there is an express authorization for the deduction in advance of interest on all
loans authoriz'ed to be made by such companies and there
is a time limitation only with respect to signature loans.
To hold otherwise is to ignore the language which has
been in the statute fro1n the beginning with respect to
loans on personal s'ecuri ty or otherwise.
The loan in the instant case was secured by a chattel
mortgage in writing signed by both borrowers and consequently is not subject to the two year limitation.
13
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3.

PREVIOUS INTERPRETATIONS.

Although this Court has considered the provisions
of the Utah Industrial Loan Act in at least two previous
cases (People's Finance wnd Thrift Company v. Varney,
75 Utah 355, 285 Pac. 304; Seaboard Finarnce Compamy v.
Wahlen, ______ Utah ______ , 260 P. 2d 556) the particular issue
herein involved has never been discussed. However, a
time limitation on loans made on the security of makers,
co-makers, indorsers, sureties, and guarantors has been
part of the Utah Act since 1927. During that twentyseven year period industrial loan companies have been
in business n1aking loans secured by mortgages for periods longer than the limitation period on signature and
co-signer loans. Companies licensed and operating under
the Utah Act have consistently made loans ·secured by
first and second real estate mortgages for periods of
several times the two year period which the law prescribes for signature and co-signer loans.
This interpretation has never been questioned. As
recently as November 19, 1953 the Bank Commissioner
rendered a written opinion on this point as follows:
"Mr. E. W. Rasmussen
Secretary-Treasurer
Home Acceptance Corporation
837 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Mr. Rasmussen:
Reference is made to our telephone conversation
of November 17 and your letter of same date regarding the making of industrial loans for a peri14
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od longer than two years.
It is the opinion of this department that it is the
intent of the Industrial Loan Act to permit loans
made upon the personal undertaking of a borrower and secured otherwise than the signature of
the maker, comaker, endorsers, sureties, or guarantors, to be made for a longer term than two
years though prohibiting the making of loans for
a longer than two years period where made solely
upon the security of such signatures.
Per'sonal regards.
Yours very truly
( s) Louis S. Leatham"
Bank Commissioner
The writer of a recent note involving finance legislation has reached the same conclusion. (Greene, Unlicensed and Licensed Usury in Utah, 4 Utah Law Review
67, 83, note 122).
The trial court's decision is without ba·sis in reason,
logic, or precedent, -and should be reversed.
4.

STATUTES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS.

The classification of loans on the basis of security
for regulatory purposes is not unusual, nor is it exclusive with the Utah Legislature. rrhe Oregon Industrial
Loan Act is an excellent example of that fact inasmuch
as its wording and history closely parallels the Utah
Act.
In 1925 the Oregon Legislature enacted an Industrial
Loan Act which provided in part as follows ( G0neral
Laws of Oregon, 1925, Chapter 303):
15
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"Section 5. Powers. Every corporation
under the provisions of this act shall have power:
To loan money on personal security, or otherwise, and to deduct interest therefor in advance

***
"Section 6. Res trictions. No corporation
under the provisions of this act shall :
1

(a) Make any lo:an on the security of
makers, co-makers, indorsers, sureties or guarantors, for a longer period than one year from the
date thereof.
(b)

***"

In 1929 the Oregon Act was amended (General Laws
of Oregon 1929, Chapter 325) and the restrictions section
was changed to read as follows :
"Section 6. Restrictions. No corporation
under the provisions of this act shall :
(a) Make any loan on the sole security of
makers, comakers, indorsers, sureties or guarantors for a longer period than one year from the
date thereof.
(b) ~!fake any loans secured by chattel mortgage for a longer period than two years from the
date thereof."
In 1931 the Oregon Act was further amended to extend the limitation on loans on the sole security of makers,
comakers, etc. from one year to eighteen months.
As can be seen from this Oregon Act loans secured
by chattel mortgages were considered to he a distinct
and separate type from loans made on the security of

16
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makers, cmnakers, etc. The conclusion is inescapable
that such different categories are contemplated by the
Utah A0t and that the two year limitation does not apply
to loans secured by chattel mortgage.
Several states have industrial loan laws wherein a
time limit is imposed upon all loans made under the
provisions of the Act except certain specified loans. Examples of this type statute are (a) Connecticut (General
Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1949, Section 5865)
wherein industrial hanks may loan money for any period
not exceeding thirty-six months, except that loans secured by mortgage of real estate may be made for any
period not exceeding thirty years; (b) Maine (Revised
Statutes of Maine 1944, Chapter 55, Section 186), wherein industrial banks are prohibited from making any loan
for a period longer than two years except in the case
of loans that are eligible for insurance under the National
Housing Act; and (c) New York (1\!IcKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated, Book 4, Part 2,
Section 294) wherein industrial banks are prohibited
from making any loan for a period longer than twentyfour months from the date thereof, except loans secured
by real estate mortgage.
The Industrial Loan Act of the State of Washington (Remington's Revised Statutes of Washington 1941
Supplement) contains a restriction clause identical with
that of the Utah Act, as follows:
"Section 3862.-9, Restrietions on powers --Prohibited loans, discounts, investments, depo~i t~,

17
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pledges, etc. No corporation under the provisions
of this act shall :
(a) 1\1:ake any loan, on security of 1nakers,
comakers, endorsers, sureties or guarantors, for a
longer period than two years from the date thereof.
(b)***"
An example of an industrial loan statute which
places a time limit on all industrial loans, regardless of
the type of security, may be found in Tennessee· (Williams
Tennessee Code Anno~tated, Volume 4, 1941 Replacement, 1952 pocket supplement):

"Section 6720.7. Corporate powers. Every
corporation formed or qualified under the provi·sion:s of this act shall *** have the following
powers ***:
(a)

***

(f) To lend nwney on the personal undertaking of a borrower or other person with or without security***.
"Se0tion 6720.10. Prohibited acts. dustrialloan and thrift cmnpany shall:
(a)

No in-

***

('b) Make any loan under the provision of
this act for a longer period th·an two years from
the date thereof." (emphasis added.)
To ~agre·e with respondents' argument in this matter
and to affirm the trial court's action this Court must
construe section 7-8-5, Subsection (1) of the Utah Act
as though it were worded as the Tennessee Act quoted

18
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above. To do this the Court must, by judicial legislation,
dele,te from the Utah Act the words "on the security of
makers, comakers, indorsers, sureties or guarantors."
It is submitted that the Court cannot reasonably or justifiably indulge in such judicial legislation and thereby
invalidate existing contract rights totaling million s of
dollars.
1

The Utah Legislature must have intended something
by including those words in the two year limitation provision. We submit that what was intended by the inclusion of those words was that the limitation provision
was not to apply to loans secured by chattel mortgages
or other security, but was t<? apply only to loans secured
by signature of the maker or other persons. The fact
that statutes from other states, notably Washington and
Oregon, contained substantially identical wording, is
further proof that the included words were not merely
the whim and caprice of the Utah Legislature, but were
in fact inserted for the purpose stated above.
As is shown by the· Agreed Statement of Record in
this matter the loan in this case was secured by a chattel
mortgage executed by the respondents. Consequently
this loan made on the security of makers, comakers, endorsers, sureties or guarantors, but rather it is a loan
made on the security of a ehattel mortgage, and, therefore, it is not within the two year limitation of Sections
7-8-5, Subsection ( 1).
As has been set forth above there is substantial legislative history and precedent for classifying industrial
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loans on the basis of the type security involved. Legislatures of certain states have seen fit to place time. limits
on all types of industrial loans. Legislatures of certain
other states have seen fit to place time limits only on
certain types of indus trial loans. Utah is in the latter
category and the Legistature ha:s not expressed an intent
to place a limitation on industrial loans secured by
chattel mortgages. If the Utah Legislature had desired
to place such a limitation on all industrial loans it could
have very simply done so with simple, clear and precise
language as described above.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court should
be reversed.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

As was set forth in the Staten1ent of Faets, supra,
the note ·and chattel mortgage involved in the instant
case were executed by respondents on May 31, 1952 and
called for repayment in twenty-four equal monthly installments beginning July 12, 1952. Consequently the last
installment would be due June 12, 1954 or 12 days longer
than two years from the date of execution.
The question of charging interest on the loan in 'advance is not an issue in this appeal, it being resolved by
this Court in the case of Seaboard Finance Company v.
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vVahlen, supra. Nor is the computation of interest involved in this appeal. The interest charged on the inS'tant
loan was computed on the basis of twenty-four month~s.
The sole basis for the trial court's dedsion was that the
final payment was not due until 12 days a£ter two years
from making the lo an. It was not contended that respondents were charged interest for those 12 days, but
only that since the due date for payments was moved up
from the last of the month to the 12th of the month that
the loan was ipso facto not within the provisions of the
Industrial Loan Act. The error of this decision has been
pointed out in Point I of this 'argument.
1

As a practical matter of doing business in making
loans the monthly due date is set after consultation with
the borrower, and such date is arranged to correspond
with the borrower's pay day or to otherwise meet his convenience. This flexibility is 'a gratuity to the borrower,
and, far fron1 being a detriment to him, is in fact a considerable convenience and advantage to him.
It was stipulated that the interest charged on the
instant loan was in excess of the ten percent simple interes~t allowed by the general interest statute of the state
(15-1-2). Consequently if the loan in question is not
properly within the provisions of the Utah Industrial
Loan Act and subject to the rates therein authorized,
the loan is usurious, resulting in complete forfeiture of
both principal and interest (15-1-7). This w'as the conclusion reached by the trial court.

Is this result war ran ted under the facts and the

law~

21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

We think not.
This Court has s~aid that a corrupt and unlawful
intent must 'be present to render 'a transaction usurious.
Fisher v. Adamson, 47 Utah 3, 151 Pac. 351; Cobb v.
Hartenstein, 47 Utah 174, 152 Pac. 424. Clearly there
can be no such intent in the instant case. Usury laws
are for ~the protection of the borrower, not to punish the
lender. Rospigliosi v Glenallen Mining Co., 69 Utah 41,
2,52 Pac. 276. The 12 days upon which the trial court
based its decision in no way harmed or was detrimental
to the borrowers, but the result of the trial court's decision is the extreme penalty of forfeiture to appellant.
It i'S a well established principle that the law frowns
on pen alties and forfeitures. Yet the result of the trial
court's decision is forfeiture of a $1300.00 loan because
of 12 days for which no interest was charged, and under
a statute which, properly construed, places no time limit
on the type of loan herein involved.
1

The trial court erred in granting respondents' mo~
tion to dismiss bec1ause that motion was based upon an
erroneous interpretati'on of the provisions of the statute.
The trial crourt also erred in granting respondents' motion for 'summary judgment because it was based on the
same mistake of law. The uction of the trial court should
be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Section 7-8-5 ( 1) does not apply to loans made upon
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the security of chattel mortgages executed by the borrower.
The result of the trial court's decision is forfeiture
and is not necessary or proper. It results from a strained,
unrealistic, and erroneous application of the statute and
indeed constitutes unwarranted and highly improper
judicial legislation.
~rhe trial court's order dismis'Sing appellant's complaint should be reversed and the judgment entered
against appellant should be vacated and set aside.

Respectfully submitted,
LOUIS H. CALLISTER and
NATHAN J. FULLMER
Attorneys for Appellant
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